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SADC's state of development and medium-term
perspectives
Subscribing to a functional-pragmatic approach, the so-
called front states of southern Africa in 1980 founded the
Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference (SADCC) as a political and economic
counterweight to apartheid South Africa. In the 1980s or
1990s most of the SADCC countries went through a
process of democratic change and conducted reforms
geared to a market economy. In 1992 the Treaty of
Windhoek saw the formation of a newly conceptualized
Southern African Development Community (SADC).
SADC's objectives extend far beyond the legal and
organizational needs of pure trade integration. Following
the democratic transition in South Africa, the organi-
zation now intends to bolster the region's political and
economic stability, develop its human and economic
potentials, and gradually proceed with the project of
integration into the world markets.
With its enlargement to include fourteen member states
and its entry into the phase of creating a free-trade area,
SADC's integration process has become more demanding
and more difficult. Accession of South Africa and the
DR Congo has not only heightened the
potentials of member states, it has also increased the
organization's heterogeneity. The region's political
stability is impaired by open and latent conflicts, and the
competitive pressure stemming from world markets will,
in the short term, tend more in the direction of
divergence than integration. On September 1, 2000, the
trade protocol came into force. For SADC this marks
only the beginning of the phase of deepened integration.
If the integration process is to be continued successfully,
SADC will, in its next step, have to tackle some urgent
organizational reforms and initiate measures geared to
political stabilization and a more balanced distribution of
the costs and benefits of integration. The following
course of events appears realistic: (a) implementation of
the SADC free-trade area within a period of roughly 10
years; (b) further deepening of functional-sectoral
cooperation; and (c) strengthening of SADC as a re-
gional organization in keeping with its financial and
administrative capacities as well as the political
competences transferred to it by the member countries.
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• For the countries of Southern Africa, regional cooperation and integration are preconditions for accelerated
economic and social development. On their own, the Southern African economies, most of them small, agriculture
based primary commodity exporters with only incipient industrial development, will not be able to attract the
necessary financial and technology transfers  to support a sustained industrialisation process.
• In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), some of the necessary conditions for enhanced economic
and social development have been met. The SADC Trade Protocol has been in effect since September 2000,
providing for the establishment of a free-trade area in the course of the coming decade. In other core areas,
including development of cross-border infrastructures, food security, or protection of natural resources, major
advances have been achieved through sectoral cooperation. However, the path towards achieving a unified
economic space in the region will prove to be still a long one.
• SADC will have to develop into a regional organization with true supranational institutions endowed with far
reaching decision-making competences. Strengthening the organisation hinges on the political will of its member
countries - and this will is not always uniform and clear-cut. SADC member countries’ divergent economic and
social development, widespread poverty, low productivity and persistent belligerent conflicts in the region represent
serious impediments for deeper integration. The role of the region's "locomotive", South Africa, is ambiguous:
fearing job losses and pursuing its own priorities, the country has thus far shown only limited  inclination to come to
terms with the rest of the region.
• Development cooperation can contribute to deep integration in the region only if member countries have the political
resolve to transfer substantial sovereign powers to the regional institutions. Existing reform proposals must be
implemented speedily; in that context, the role of the SADC Secretariat as the organisation’s principal policy
formulation and coordination institution must be strengthened. German development cooperation should focus on
support to SADC Trade Protocol implementation, private sector promotion, infrastructure development in selected
areas, and protection of natural resources.
• Regional integration in Southern Africa will only be successful if other goals are achieved in tandem, including
political and economic stabilisation of the region, mobilization of savings and investment, and a gradual integration
of the region into the world markets. The establishment of regional funds could contribute to economic
harmonisation and social cohesion and help to overcome supply-side bottlenecks in the SADC region. Here,
harnessing its own experience, the EU could assume the role of "leading donor". Negotiations between EU and
SADC on the future  post-Lomé trade agreement could provide a chance for the EU to assume such a new role.
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2SADC's heterogeneity
In terms of area, population figures, size of their
domestic markets, per capita incomes, and social and
political situation, the SADC countries present a highly
heterogeneous picture (Table 1). This situation is further
complicated by pronounced internal disparities in several
countries. South Africa in particular is marked by an
extremely unequal distribution of incomes. Some 40% of
the 190 million persons in SADC are living in poverty,
30 to 40% of the working population is unemployed or
forced to eke out a living in the subsistence economy.
Table 1:
SADC's heterogeneity - selected countries (1998)
Country Po-
pula-
tion
(mio.)
GDP
p.c.
(US $)
GDP
growth
p.a.
(91-98)
HDI
ranking
(of
174)
Share of
manufact.
industry
in GDP
(%)
Botswana 1,6 3.600 5,1 122 4,9
Malawi 10,5 200 4,4 159 13,6
Mauritius 1,2 3.700 5,1 59 24,4
Mozambique 16,9 210 5,7 169 10,9
South Africa 39,3 2.880 1,2 101 23,9
Tanzania 32,1 210 2,8 156 6,9
Zambia 8,7 380 0,9 151 11,8
Zimbabwe 11,6 610 1,9 130 15,4
Sources: World Bank, UNDP, AfDB
The differentials encountered in the state of the region's
functional economic specialization are also substantial.
Most of the countries concerned are marked by heavy
dependence on a limited number of export goods as well
as on external transfers. Only South Africa, Mauritius,
and Zimbabwe have a manufacturing sector of any
significance and, correspondingly, a more markedly
diversified external-trade sector. In most of the member
countries, however, two or three primary commodities
account for over 50% of exports. This makes the region
subject to the sharp, often asymmetrical price shocks
typical for world-market cycles. The highest external
debt, over 200% of GDP, is noted for the DR Congo,
Mozambique, and Zambia. While a number of countries
were able to limit inflation to one-digit levels prices have
been rising by 30% p.a. and more in Malawi, Zambia
and Zimbabwe. In view of this heterogeneity there is
little prospect of economic convergence within the
foreseeable future.
Potentials of and obstacles to integration
SADC constitutes the most significant economic space in
Subsaharan Africa. Its member states account for a
common GDP of some US$ 180 billion. Intraregional
trade, with its volume of US$ 5.2 billion according to
SADC data, accounts for 20% of all exports, a figure that
is relatively high for intraregional trade among
developing countries. The most dynamic development is
shown here by trade between South Africa and the other
SADC countries: in the course of the last five years the
volume of trade has grown by a factor of 1.5.
The evolution of regional trade does, however, show
signs of growing imbalances between the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU), consisting of
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swazi-
land, and the other SADC countries (Graph 1). SACU is
currently the hub of intraregional trade, in particular in
manufactured goods. Viewed in terms of the revealed
comparative advantage index, SACU's industrial
products are internationally competitive in over 80
groups. Yet, also the other SADC countries have a
potential of products competitive in intraregional trade
that is nowhere near exhausted. A consistent lib-
eralization of the South African market could give these
countries an enormous surge in growth through trade
creation not necessarily marked by trade diversion. The
most important product groups with as yet unexhausted
trade potential include food, beverages and tobacco,
textiles and clothing, as well as a number of primary
commodities.
In the medium term, however, not static gains from trade
but the potential dynamic effects of functional speciali-
zation should form the core of integration efforts in
southern Africa. If South Africa develops dynamically, it
can assume the role of a center of networked production
structures in which the SADC countries would position
themselves in keeping with their specific competitive
advantages. The countries making up SADC already
account for the lion's share of foreign direct investment
in Africa, and further increases may be anticipated if
tangible headway is made in liberalizing the regional
market. After all, this is the region's only chance to
attract the necessary financial and technology transfers to
support a sustained industrialization process. The region
has abundant reserves of raw materials, and the
possibility of exchanging and processing them inside
SADC is seen as a crucial potential for future
development. This goes for instance for mineral
resources no less than for export of energy won from
water power and cooperation geared to an improved use
of water resources.
A crucial obstacle to any deepened integration of SADC
must be sought in the open and latent conflicts in the
region, in which several member states are involved. The
regional Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has
thus far largely failed in this regard. Without its
authorization, Zimbabwe and Namibia have intervened
militarily both in the DR Congo and in Angola. The deep
political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has become a
new test case for the region as well as for South Africa's
leadership in stability-related matters in the region. In
view of the great conflict potential in the region
(incomplete nation-building processes, conflicts over
land, water, and raw materials), there would appear to be
an urgent need to strengthen regional conflict-resolution
mechanisms. This will only serve to safeguard peace and
prosperity in the region if in tandem the populations of
all countries in the region gain better access to resources
as well as to the making of political decisions.
Graph 1: Growing trade imbalances within SADC (1993 – 1997)
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3Another obstacle to deepened integration is the
membership of all SADC countries in other regional
organizations and trade agreements. For instance, the
SACU customs union includes five SADC countries,
nine countries are at the same time members of the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Tanzania belongs to the East African
Cooperation (EAC), South Africa has signed free-trade
agreements with the EU and Brazil, and so on.
Overlapping memberships entail various technical
problems: different rules of origin are introduced;
SADC's rapid development into a customs union is
impeded; multiple contributions due in connection with
rounds of negotiations and membership fees constitute an
additional burden in this context. But the lack of political
commitment to SADC as the single integration project
may be of even greater impact here.
The EU's trade agreement with South Africa threatens to
undermine regional trade preferences, and for South
Africa's SACU partners the agreement also means budget
problems due to customs losses. The EU has announced
its willingness to contribute to compensation. In the next
few years, when the EU, in keeping with the provisions
of the Cotonou Agreement, enters into negotiations with
SADC on a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement
(REPA), the budget- and competition-related burdens
facing SADC will have to be clarified. The region's less
developed countries are unlikely in any event to
voluntarily give up their preferential access to the EU
markets in favor of a REPA if the industrialization and
trade effects anticipated for SADC are concentrated in
South Africa and, at best, a handful of neighboring
countries.
South Africa's ambivalent role
SADC's development perspectives largely depend on the
potential and the interests of South Africa, the region's
dominant economy. It is South Africa's strategic,
political, and economic weight that gives SADC its
actual international significance. Hopes on the part of the
international community for a "renaissance" in southern
Africa are mainly based on the positive impacts that
South Africa could develop for the region as a whole.
And it is only since South Africa's accession to SADC
that intraregional trade has reached noteworthy
dimensions.
But South Africa's dominance is also a burden on SADC,
both economically and politically. On the one hand, the
South African government time and again underlines the
importance it attaches to SADC. It plans to make up for
existing development differentials by aiming at a more
rapid, unilateral liberalization in connection with the
implementation of the trade protocol. On the other hand,
in view of the internal development tasks facing it, South
Africa appears to be wary of overcommitting itself in
SADC either financially or in terms of integration.
Fearing job losses and pursuing its own priorities, the
South African government has thus far shown only
limited inclination to come to terms with the rest of the
region. For instance, to protect domestic jobs, South
Africa has insisted on rather complicated rules of origin
and numerous exceptions that are hardly compatible with
the region's interests.
South Africa's interests also play a weighty role in
SADC's common security policy. The mechanisms
geared to tying South Africa into regional responsibility
and safeguarding the rights of codetermination of all
countries in the region are still too weak. The integration
process requires from South Africa, and precisely from
South Africa, a large measure of willingness as well as
the capability to mediate, since South Africa is not only
by far the largest economy in the region but would also
benefit substantially from a more stable political
situation in the SADC region.
Institutional efficiency
The SADC Secretariat, headquartered in Gaborone,
Botswana, is in charge of policy formulation and
coordination of the integration process. While this
mandate is anchored in SADC's treaty of establishment,
it is, in practice, often not respected either by the
member states or by the subordinate sector-coordination
organs. These coordinating units are SADC's executive
organs. Their responsibilities and agendas are for the
most part defined in sector protocols which are adopted
by summits of the heads of government and state and
must be ratified by two thirds of the member countries.
The most important one is the trade protocol; following
protracted and difficult negotiations, the process of
implementing it got underway in September 2000.
Thus far there are only two sector units that are jointly
funded by the member countries and are thus genuine
regional organs with supranational status (the so-called
sector commissions for transportation and commu-
nication and for genetic resources). The other 19 units,
though, including those responsible for industry and
trade, report to the relevant sector ministry of the country
in which they are headquartered. They have for most part
neither sufficient regional authority nor the staff and
technical resources needed for their tasks. At present,
measures and programs are not sufficiently coordinated
between units, even in cases where closely related policy
fields are concerned (like in the case of industry/trade
and finances/investment). Locating these units with
national administrations did, however, save personnel
costs and generate more ownership among member
countries.
In the SADC framework treaty and the sector protocols
already signed by the heads of state, the member
countries have committed themselves to SADC only to
the extent that this has not meant ceding any substantial
political competences to the organs of SADC. All
member countries pay the same contributions to the
SADC budget, independently of their populations and
national product. The underfunding of the organization
that results from this practice entails a good measure of
dependence on donors: some 90% of the total number of
projects and programs currently underway, the so-called
SADC Programme of Action, is financed from donor
funds.
Avenues to reforming SADC
In a comprehensive analysis, the so-called Chipeta
Report pointed to SADC's organizational weaknesses.
The end of the discussion process saw the presentation of
a few central reform proposals, which have yet to be
implemented, viz.:
- to reduce the projects contained in the SADC
Programme of Action to projects with a
demonstrably regional character and to raise the
funding contributions borne by SADC member
countries;
- to merge sector-coordinating units to form greater
units covering the most important development
clusters;
- to strengthen the role of the SADC Secretariat in the
field of policy formulation and coordination.
A special meeting of the SADC Council of Ministers
decided in November 2000 in Gaborone on a reform of
the most important SADC institutions which follows
largely the proposals of the report. The secretariat shall
be strengthened and assigned important new tasks.
Closely linked policy areas such as trade, industry,
finances, and investment as well as food, agriculture, and
natural resources are to be fused to form four
supranational authorities (to be called directorates), with
the existing sector-coordinating units being gradually
disbanded over a period of two years.
SADC's finance ministers and central bank presidents
have substantially improved the exchange of information
between them and are developing mechanisms aimed at
strengthening the process of macroeconomic
convergence. The Council of Ministers has been
presented a proposal on the funding of the organization.
It provides in essence for the introduction of a SADC-
wide tax on private-sector transactions or on
consumption (e.g. a value-added tax).
In view of the as yet low level of efficiency of SADC's
institutions as well as substantial economic and political
obstacles, the free-trade agreement will inevitably
encounter some setbacks in the process of implemen-
tation. But learning processes and economic successes in
this area are of considerable importance for the further
course of the integration process. One field of activity
for donors with great development potential is support
for the provision of regional public goods - far in
advance of the need for member countries to relinquish
any substantial sovereignty.
Strategic approaches to cooperation with SADC
Promotion of regional cooperation between developing
countries and their gradual integration into the world
economy are aims wholly in line with the development
objectives of the German government. The strategic role
of German development cooperation should be to
strengthen the SADC Secretariat in exercising its
governance tasks as a supranational institution and
to contribute to the pacification and economic har-
monization of the SADC region. This could include con-
tributions geared to strengthening implementation
capacities in selected sectoral focal points as well as to
invigorating participation from the private sector and
other parts of the civil society. An important step toward
optimizing donor contributions would be to review the
current activities of the SADC Programme of Action in
terms of its conduciveness to integration. In view of
SADC's great level of dependence on donors, an
important consideration for donor institutions would be
to proceed cautiously, allowing SADC the time it needs
for the learning and negotiation processes it faces. All
activities should include a tangible contribution from
SADC itself.
German cooperation with SADC must be better
coordinated with the cooperation efforts of other donors,
in particular with the EU. Annual coordination meetings
should be used to agree on at least the broad lines of
in southern Africa. If they are to make rapid headway in
implementing the trade protocol, the secretariat and the
weaker member countries will continue to be in need of
external advisory services. One of the fields in which
German development cooperation is already active, and
where its commitment should be enlarged, is a more
effective involvement of the regionally oriented activities
of intermediary institutions and relevant
nongovernmental organizations (e.g. in the field of
business promotion or resource protection).
Over the medium time, regional structural funds could
constitute a low-cost funding instrument for measures
keyed to integration in the field of infrastructure
provision or social development in SADC. The EU's
experiences indicate that the negative concentration
effects entailed by economic integration can be al-
leviated by means of a targeted policy based on regional
funds. Some of SADC's member countries will
presumably only be able to fully benefit from their
comparative advantages following such a phase of
accelerated economic and social development. Supplied
from transfers from stronger member states and donors,
such regional funds could be used to finance a politically
necessary and structurally desired compensation for the
effects of a rapid process of trade integration. As one of
the "leading donors", the EU should push for an
approach of this sort.
Regine Qualmann
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without which no effective integration is likely to
succeed, can be achieved only if the donors do not
compete with one another on the funding of projects.
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A gradual shift of development-cooperation activities
from the bilateral to the SADC level should be sought for
in fields especially relevant to integration. But this could
be approached only together with a reformed and more
effective SADC that can fill the role of a strategic partner
